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Abstract
Although there exist very accurate hardware systems for measuring traffic on the internet, their widespread use
for analysis tasks is limited by their high cost. On the other hand, less expensive, software-based systems exist that
are widely available and can be used to perform a number of simple analysis tasks. The caveat with using such
software systems is that application of standard analysis methods cannot proceed blindly because inherent distortions
exist in the measurements obtained from software systems. The goal of this paper is to analyze common Internet
measurement systems to discover the effect of these distortions on common analysis tasks. Then by selecting one
specific task, periodic signal detection, a more in-depth analysis is conducted which derives a signal representation
to capture the salient features of the measurement and develops a periodic detection mechanism designed for the
measurement system which outperforms an existing detection method not optimized for the measurement system.
Finally, through experiments the importance of understanding the relationship between the input traffic, measurement
system configuration and detection method performance is emphasized.
1 Introduction
Practical internet network traffic measurement systems have been available for a number of years and have led to the
development of a variety of analysis tools, such as bandwidth estimation techniques, to extract useful information from
measurements or for network security purposes like detecting maltraffic traversing the network. Typically, selecting
an Internet measurement system tends to be based on characteristics such as cost or maximum time resolution, e.g., if
the application demands high timing precision one may select a higher cost hardware measurement system. We argue
that measurement system selection should also consider the specific application, along with related data representation
and data processing issues. Understanding how a measurement system affects the precision of data being collected
makes it possible to improve the application performance by selecting appropriate data representation and tools. As
an example application, we consider the problem of detecting periodic denial-of-service (DOS) attacks, which can be
characterized by the presence of a relatively low rate periodic traffic in otherwise “random” aggregate traffic. Clearly
this problem could be approached by selecting a very high resolution measurement system (e.g., a hardware based
one), but at a potentially prohibitive cost. A key contribution of our work is to show that in many cases lower end (e.g.,
software based) measurement systems can be used as effectively, as long as the effect of the measurement system has
been taken into account in designing the analysis techniques.
∗This work is supported in part by the National Science Foundation’s Networking Technology and Systems (NeTS) program, grant number
CNS-0626696.
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Studying the impact of a measurement system on Internet measurement analysis applications, such as DOS detec-
tion, can sometimes be framed using standard digital signal processing (DSP) tools. However, a key difficulty is that
most DSP based analyses are based on the assumption that the measurement timing (e.g., when samples are captured)
is independent of the signal being measured. Instead, practical Internet measurement systems provide measurements
that are triggered by the signal being measured, i.e., by packet arrivals. This is not a problem if individual packet
arrival events are recorded separately and with a high precision clock, but it makes modeling the measurement system
more difficult when timing is no longer reliable (because a host system has to be interrupted to record a packet arrival)
and/or multiple packet arrival intervals are recorded jointly (due to so called interrupt coalescence).
Most currently used analysis methods tend to ignore the timing distortion introduced by the measurement system
and create a signal representing arrivals per measurement interval. “Off the shelf” DSP tools are then used to analyze
these signals, implicitly assuming that those measurement intervals are equal, which is not true in practice for typical
Internet measurement systems. Instead, we propose to use a detailed understanding of both measurement system and
signal to be detected in order to design specific detection strategies. These strategies can then handle situations of high
variability in measurement intervals. Towards this goal, we study measurement systems based on interrupt coalescence
and propose a new detection system that can operate under challenging interrupt coalescence conditions.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 includes a general overview for both software and hardware network
measurement systems describing the systematic differences and limitations inherent to software based systems. In
Section 3 we narrow our focus to software measurement systems using one type of interrupt coalescence. Here we
define a suitable signal representation and perform an in-depth analysis of the measurement system effects for an
idealized Poisson input signal. Following this analysis, in Section 4.2 we attempt to detect a periodic signal using a
detection method which expects an accurate, uniformly sampled signal and observe the loss in performance when, due
to the measurement system, this is not the case. In Section 5 we discuss the intuition we used while designing our
detection algorithm, and give a detailed description of its operation. Section 6 provides an experimental comparison
between our detection scheme and the previously mentioned detection method and provides some guidelines as to
which detection method is the best choice given a measurement system and knowledge of traffic rates.
1.1 Related Work
Studying the effect of the measurement system is not an entirely new problem. Partridge et al. examined the effect of
signal representation on wireless network data traffic, and showed how a given representation could lead to different
analysis methods in [1]. The difference in their work and ours is that they begin with accurate measurements and
use different representations based on the analysis task. We on the other hand chose the representation that fits the
measurement system most naturally and design analysis methods to fit the representation.
Prasad et al. looked at how interrupt coalescence altered standard network tomography methods, and discussed
some methods to detect the presence of coalescence in measured signals in [2]. Our work is different because we do
not simply show the effect of the measurement system, but instead we use our knowledge of the measurement system
and its inherent effect to design strategies for a specific networking problem, namely DOS attack detection. We
chose DOS attack detection because recent work [3, 4] has shown malware and specifically DOS attacks can produce
periodic traffic. Thus DOS attack detection becomes a problem of periodic signal detection, which is a common
signal processing task. For comparison we use an attack detection method, called the periodic attack detector (PAD),
proposed by He in [5], which is was shown to produce good detection performance in [6]. The PAD is different from
our method because it is not designed for a specific measurement system.
In this paper we focus on periodic DOS attack detection, but our detection method could be used to detect the
presence of periodic traffic in aggregate network streams due to other network anomalies. For instance, in [7, 8]
periodic traffic was shown to arise as a consequence of bottlenecks or similar network congestion problems. Because
of this periodic nature, signal processing techniques (e.g., spectral analysis techniques based on wavelets) were applied
to network measurements as a way to quickly detect underperforming networks.
2 Measurement System Overview
Measurement systems fall into two main categories: hardware and software based systems. As illustrated in Figure 2
the key differentiating factor between hardware and software systems is how time stamps are generated for the in-
coming packets. In hardware based systems, like the popular DAG cards developed by Donnelly [9], the packet time
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stamp is generated by a very accurate hardware clock separate from the host system. The precision in the packet time
stamps makes hardware system measurements amenable to standard DSP analysis tools. Alternatively, in software
based systems time stamps are generated in software, e.g., as in the Tstat tool [10], by querying the host system clock.
Because the hardware based system time stamps the data before it is processed by the network interface card (NIC)
many of the timing errors introduced in the NIC are avoided. We now focus on software based systems, discuss the
possible timing errors associated with the system and describe how we approximate the effects of the timing errors in
simulations which are conducted later.
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Figure 1: System overview for both the software and hardware based network measurement system.
2.1 Software Based Measurement Systems
As mentioned above the key difference between hardware and software measurement systems how and when the
incoming packets are time stamped. While a hardware system generates time stamps before it is processed by the
NIC, in a software-based system the processing of the packet done by the NIC produces three timing delays, pictured
in Figure 2.1. The first source of delay is a packet size dependant delay that occurs in transferring the packet data
to memory. The second delay is due to interrupt coalescence, which depends on the arrival timing of the incoming
packet stream. Interrupt coalescence is more complicated than the data transfer delay, and can produce different types
of error depending on the user configuration. The last form of delay occurs due to software, which queries the system
clock for each received packet and creates artificial timing delays when multiple packet are received simultaneously
(due to interrupt coalescence). Since these delays are packet size, system configuration and incoming packet rate
dependent their effects can not, in general, be modeled or removed and therefore we do not have accurate timing in
the measurements as was the case in a hardware system. Let m[n] represent the time stamps of the packets as they
are received at the NIC. Then we define m′[n] to be the packet time stamp after the packet has been transferred to
memory, and X [k] is the vector representation (defined below) of the measurements following interrupt coalescence
and software time stamping.
Figure 2: Processing Delays in Software Measurement System
We now describe in detail the sources of delay associated with the software measurement system, and describe
methods used to approximate the timing effects in our simulations. The analysis presented here is similar to the
work of Salah and El-Badawi in [11] and [12], however in their work they modeled the system components using
queuing system models more common to networking. In our work we attempt to approximate the measurement system
components using simple signal processing models, such as a delay, or by deriving an alternate signal representation
which simplifies analysis yet still maintains the overall effect of the measurement system.
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2.1.1 Packet Transfer to Memory
In a software based system the incoming packet data is first transferred to system memory. The NIC waits for this
transfer to complete before asserting a system interrupt letting the CPU know that the packet data is available for
processing. Commonly two methods are possible to transfer data from the NIC to memory, direct memory access
(DMA) and programmed input output (PIO). With PIO the CPU is used to transfer the data from the NIC to memory.
This often overburdens the CPU, which is already stressed in a high speed network measurement system, so in this
paper we limit ourselves to the study of DMA data transfers [12].
The delay incurred in transferring the packet data to memory is a combination of two delays. The first is the time
spent waiting to access the data transfer bus, which in this work we assume to be negligible. The second form of delay
is the length of time required to actually transfer the data to memory. Because the speed of the DMA channel is fixed,
the amount of time required to transfer a packet depends only on the size of the packet itself.
In this paper we assume that the time required to transfer the packet to memory is a constant multiple of the packet
size, and we approximate this delay by simply addingPacketSize/BitRate to the input packet time stamp to generate
the new packet time stamp following data transfer. BitRate is the bit rate of the network link and PacketSize is the
size in bits of the current packet. Thus our approximation represents the timing of the last bit of the packet, which
reflects the packet size dependence of the data transfer component in the software measurement system.
Figure 2.1.1 shows an example of the packet size dependant data transfer model along with our approximation of
the model. As defined above m[n] represents the time stamp of the beginning of an packet received at the NIC. The
delay D[n] is the delay incurred in transferring the packet data to the host system memory. This delay depends on
the size of the packet. Therefore at the output of the transfer model the time stamp of the beginning of the incoming
packet is now m′[n] = m[n] + D[n]. In our approximation (lower section) the end of the packet is now used to
indicate the time stamp of the packet, which is given by m′[n] = m[n] + PacketSize/BitRate. By using a delay of
PacketSize/BitRate to approximate D[n] our model doesn’t require knowledge of the actual packet transfer time,
yet still maintains a packet size dependent delay.
Figure 3: Example of Packet Size Dependant Transfer Model vs. Approximation of Model
2.1.2 Interrupt Coalescence
In a software based measurement system, after the packet data has been transferred to memory the NIC asserts a
system interrupt informing the CPU that the packet is ready for processing. In low speed networks, an interrupt is
asserted for each packet that the NIC receives, since at these speeds, e.g., 10 Mbps to 100 Mbps, the CPU is capable
of responding to an interrupt service request (ISR) for each packet. However, in high speed networks e.g., 1 Gbps and
beyond, the number of packets received increases significantly and as a consequence the number of interrupt service
requests made by the NIC increases as well. This can result in a condition called receive livelock where the host
system cannot perform any processing and spends all of its clock cycles servicing the interrupt requests. To prevent
livelock, a technique called interrupt coalescence is used in high speed NIC which reduces the workload of the host
CPU by lowering the number of interrupts issued by the NIC [13].
Three variations of interrupt coalescence are commonly used: timer-based IC (TIC), packet-based IC (PIC), and
hybrid time based methods (HIC), such as those found in the Intel NIC [13–15]. Because the goal of interrupt coa-
lescence is to reduce the interrupt rate imposed on the measurement system by the NIC, the obvious solution is to not
issue an interrupt for each packet received. PIC does just this: after a packet arrives the NIC card waits until a given
number of subsequent packets is received before an interrupt is asserted [13]. The limitation of this method is that
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during low traffic rate conditions the latency between the first packet arrival and interrupt assertion becomes excessive.
Alternatively TIC waits a fixed amount of time after the arrival of a packet before issuing an interrupt. In low traffic
rate situations long fixed time values also lead to excessive latency for TIC. Figure 4 shows how TIC and PIC generate
interrupt service requests. On the left TIC is used with parameter Tfix, which is the length of time after the initial
packet arrival before an interrupt is issued. Similarly on the right PIC is pictured where the number of packets received
before asserting an interrupt is set to 5.
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 Time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Figure 4: Example of interrupt coalescence using TIC and PIC methods
Although these simple methods successfully reduce processor burden, their limitations create a need for HICs such
as that developed by Intel, which incorporates two separate mechanisms to control the number of interrupts asserted
on the system. These mechanisms are controlled by two separate timers, namely the absolute and packet timers [14].
Figure 5 illustrates the difference between the timer variations. The packet timer, Tpack, begins counting down after
a packet has been received. If additional packets are received before the timer finishes counting down, then Tpack is
reset and begins counting down again. Anytime Tpack reaches zero before a packet arrives to reset the timer, the NIC
will assert an interrupt and all packets that were received since the previous interrupt will be serviced. During low
traffic rate conditions the packet timer prevents excessive latency in the packet processing.
Tabs Tabs
Absolute Timing
Time
...
Tpack Tpack
Packet Timing
Time
...
Interrupt
Asserted
Interrupt
Asserted
Interrupt
Asserted
Interrupt
Asserted
T[n] T[n] T[n]
...
Figure 5: Examples of interrupt coalescence with absolute and packet timers controlling the assertion of interrupts
However, under high traffic rate situations when packets arrive in rapid succession it is possible that the packet
timer will never count down to zero, so a second timer called the absolute timer, Tabs, is needed. Similar to fixed time
IC, the absolute timer delays the assertion of the interrupt service request for a fixed interval following the receipt of
an incoming packet. All packets received during the interval Tabs are processed by the system during the same ISR
as the initial packet. The absolute and packet timers work together to ensure interrupts are asserted efficiently during
high and low traffic rate conditions.
2.1.3 Software Induced Delay
After interrupt coalescence generates an interrupt service request for a group of packets, each must be processed by
the system. Processing, which includes time stamp generation, is performed individually for all packets in the group.
Although the processing time is relatively short because it is done on individual packets the time stamps for the packets
received during a single interrupt are generally not the same. The inter-arrival timing created between packets serviced
by the same interrupt is artificial and does not reflect any of the characteristics of the original signal. Therefore it is
up to the designer of the analysis task whether or not to treat the individual packet time stamps as being accurate or
to remove the artificial inter-arrival timing in a way that does not remove important information about the signal. The
artificial inter-arrival timing is essentially high frequency noise that is added to the signal. In order to reduce the effect
of this high frequency noise we selected a more natural signal representation, which we describe in the following
section.
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Figure 2.1.3 shows how the delay in packet time stamping caused by the software creates artificial inter-arrival
timings. In this example an ISR was asserted after IC, which contains 3 packets for processing. In the top portion
of the figure a software delay, S is introduced which is the processing time for the software to generate a time stamp
for the individual packet. This creates an artificial inter-arrival time between measurements M [0] and M [1] as well
as between M [1] and M [2] equal to S. In the bottom portion of the figure our signal model, explained in the next
section, treats packets which arrive during the same ISR as one measurement thus removing the effect of the artificial
inter-arrival timing.
Figure 6: Example of Software Induced Delay vs. Signal Model
3 Analysis
In this section we analyze the software measurement system further. First we consider what is the best way to represent
the signal at the output of the measurement system. Because of timing inaccuracies created by interrupt coalescence
and software delay, determining the best signal representation is important and not necessarily straight forward. Sec-
ond we analyze in more depth a measurement system that uses hybrid interrupt coalescence. This IC method is
selected because it is the most general of the systems described above. Specifically, HIC produces measurements
where both the number of packets per measurement and the measurement inter-arrival times are variable. PIC and TIC
therefore represent particular cases of HIC, where either the number of packets per measurement is fixed (PIC) or the
measurement inter-arrival times are approximately fixed (TIC).
3.1 Signal Representation
The first step in improving analysis based on software measurements is to redefine the signal representation. A
standard uniformly sampled signal representation is not appropriate for software based measurements because, as
mentioned previously, measurements are triggered by the signal being measured, i.e. the measurement timings are
signal dependent. Due to interrupt coalescence, multiple packets are delivered to the system jointly and artificial inter-
arrival timing is created by the software that generates the packet time stamps. This artificial inter-arrival timing is
unrelated to the actual packet timing and is a source of error. Thus it is desirable to remove software induced delay
and to do so the most natural to represent the signal as a vector:
X(k) = {M(k), C(k)} (1)
where M(k) is the time stamp of the kth group of packets measured and C(k) gives the number of packets in the
group. This represents precisely the measured information: each interrupt provides timing information and a packet
count.
This redefined signal representation models the data at the last stage of the measurement system. The entire mea-
surement system consists of the three modules described above: packet transfer, interrupt coalescence, and software
induced delay. Figure 2.1 shows how a collection of packets traverses the measurement system, and how the final
output measurement is achieved. The packet transfer model was created to approximate the time required transfer a
packet to memory. Our model uses a delay equal to the size of the packet in bits divided by the bit rate of the in-
coming link. This allows us to model the packet size dependence of the delay without actual knowledge of the packet
transfer time. Next we subject this delayed signal to interrupt coalescence, which as mentioned previously is a timing
dependant delay which generates an ISR signaling to the host system that it can begin processing the packets. In order
to avoid the artificial inter-arrival timing created in software, in the software induced delay model, we use the vector
signal representation, X [k] = {M [k], C[k]} where M [k] represents the time stamp of the first packet generated by
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the system, and C[k] gives the number of packets received simultaneously from the corresponding ISR. The selected
signal representation removes unwanted noise from the signal while, with proper processing, retains much of desired
signal properties for analysis.
3.2 Further Analysis of HIC
With the new signal representation that was derived in the previous section we proceed to analyze specifically hybrid
interrupt coalescence. We focus on HIC because the analysis is more general than could be done for PIC or TIC, as
these can be seen as particular cases of HIC where either the inter-arrival times or the number of packets are fixed.
3.2.1 Ideal Poisson Process
In order to understand the effect of HIC we consider an idealized case where the input to the measurement system is
a signal with exponentially distributed inter-arrival times (with scale parameter λ), and the output is a new signal with
our vector signal representation. Similar to [16], we start with an ideal input to gather intuition about the measurement
system and develop analytic results for the measurement system output. Although what is presented here is specific to
an ideal Poisson input process we feel that the analysis presented illustrates the biases that one would encounter when
trying to estimate the input parameters of actual Internet traffic using the measurement system output.
In the following analysis we use the variable Y to indicate the inter-arrival time between measurements, and use a
subscript on the variable to indicate either: the number of packets contained in the measurement or the distribution the
inter-arrival time is derived from. Also we indicate estimates of random variables by theˆoperator, e.g. λˆ is an estimate
of the actual scale parameter λ. Further, we make use of two variations of the exponential distribution, specifically the
shifted exponential distribution and the right-side truncated exponential distribution. As defined in [17] the probability
density function (PDF) and expected value for the shifted and right-side truncated exponential distributions are given
by:
fYShift(y|λ, b) =
e
−
(
y−Tpack
λ
)
λ
E[YShift] = λShift = λ+ b
(2)
where λ corresponds to the scale parameter of the input sequence and the support for the shifted exponential distribu-
tion ranges from [b,∞].
fYTrunc(y|λ, b) =
e−
y
λ
λ(1− e−k)
E[YTrunc] = λTrunc = λ
[
1− (k + 1)e−k
1− e−k
] (3)
again λ is the input scale parameter, k = b
λ
and the support is defined on [0, b].
Consider first two consecutive measurements each of which contains only a single packet. Because each mea-
surement only contains one packet each ISR that triggered the measurement must have been generated by Tpack. The
time-stamp for each measurement is then the original time that the packet arrived at the NIC plus some fixed delay
(TPack plus system processing delay), which we assume is constant. The inter-arrival time between the measurements
therefore corresponds to the actual inter-arrival time of the original packets. If we consider only such packet pairs and
use them to estimate the expected value of the inter-arrival times, it would be reasonable to guess that expected value
would be an accurate estimate of the mean of the input inter-arrival times, i.e.
λˆ =
1
N
∑
∀n:C[n]=C[n−1]=1
[M [n]−M [n− 1]]
N =
∑
∀n:C[n]=C[n−1]=1
1
λˆ ≈ λ
(4)
However, due to the way the packet timer works it is only possible to get back-to-back single packet measurements
if the inter-arrival time is strictly greater than Tpack, as shown in Figure 7a. Thus the inter-arrival times we consider
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(a) One Packet (b) Two Packet
Figure 7: Examples featuring one packet per measurement 7a and two packets per measurement 7b
are all strictly greater than Tpack and are not exponentially distributed but instead belong to the shifted exponential
distribution. Clearly our estimate of the input scale parameter is wrong, but by knowing the value of Tpack we
can correct our estimate by using the expression for expected value above. Letting b = Tpack in Equation 2 we
find that λˆshift = λˆ + Tpack. Therefore by subtracting Tpack we obtain an estimate of the input scale parameter,
λˆ = λˆShift − TPack.
Next we consider a slightly more complex situation, measurements that contain two packets. Specifically, Y2 =
{M [n] − M [n − 1] : C[n] = 2}. The inter-arrival time of a measurement with two packets is the sum of two
inter-arrival times as depicted in Figure 7b. The first inter-arrival time is between the last packet in the previous
measurement and the first packet in the current measurement (indicated by I1 in Figure 7b). This inter-arrival time
must be greater than Tpack, otherwise the subsequent packet would be coalesced with the previous packet. Therefore
this inter-arrival time falls into the shifted exponential distribution case. The second inter-arrival time is between the
two packets in the measurement (I2 in Figure 7b), which must be strictly less than Tpack otherwise the packet timer
would have generated an interrupt. This second type of inter-arrival time is not exponentially distributed but belongs
to the right-sided truncated exponential distribution.
The inter-arrival time of measurements containing two packets, i.e. Y2, is then the summation of two random
variables, Y2 = Yshift+Ytrunc. Therefore when estimating the expected value of inter-arrival times for measurements
containing two packets it is expected that λˆ2 = λˆTrunc + λˆShift. However based on simulation this is actually not
the case. Instead the expected value of the inter-arrival times of measurements with two packets is: λˆ2 = λˆShift + λˆ.
This is likely caused by the ratio of λ and Tpack. When k is large, which occurs when the value of TPack is too large
for the input traffic rate, then λTrunc ∼= λ.
To complete our analysis we consider the distribution of inter-arrival times for all measurements (i.e. any number
of packets per measurement). To do this we first find the PDF of the inter-arrival times of the measurements with two
packets. This is found to be:
Y2 = Y + YShift
fY2(y2|λ, Tpack) = fY (y|λ) ∗ fYShift(yshift|λ, Tpack)
fY2(y2|λ, Tpack) =
(y2 − Tpack)e
−
(
y2−Tpack
λ
)
λ2
(5)
Notice that we consider the sum of one inter-arrival time from the shifted exponential distribution, and one from the
standard exponential distribution instead of the truncated exponential distribution. This is done to be consistent with
the observation made above.
Similarly we can compute the PDF of the inter-arrival times of the measurements with i packets as:
Yi = Y + Yi−1
fYi(yi|λ, Tpack) = fY (y|λ) ∗ fYi−1(yi−1|λ, Tpack)
fYi(yi|λ, Tpack) =
(yi − Tpack)
i−1e
−
(
yi−Tpack
λ
)
λi(i− 1)!
(6)
When considering the distribution of inter-arrival times for all measurements, we have the following probability
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distribution:
P (y = yˆ) = PYShift(yshift = yˆ) +
N∑
i=2
PYi(yi = yˆ) (7)
where N is some maximum value for the number of packets in a measurement (this is arbitrary). Therefore:
P (y = yˆ) =
e
−
(
yˆ−Tpack
λ
)
λ
+
N∑
i=2
(yˆ − Tpack)
i−1e
−
(
yˆ−Tpack
λ
)
λi(i− 1)!
P (y = yˆ) =
e
−
(
yˆ−Tpack
λ
)
λ
N∑
i=0
(
yˆ−Tpack
λ
)i
(i)!
N →∞
P (y = yˆ) =
e
−
(
yˆ−Tpack
λ
)
e
(
yˆ−Tpack
λ
)
λ
P (y = yˆ) =
1
λ
(8)
Thus if we consider inter-arrivals of measurements with any number of packets the distribution converges to a
uniform value. This becomes important when we develop our detection method where we use the uniformly distributed
assumption to distinguish “random” background traffic from background traffic combined with periodic attack traffic.
Note that convergence above also applies when Y2 = Yshift + Ytrunc instead of the approximation made in the
above derivation, i.e., Y2 = Y + Ytrunc. Further the above convergence also applies to an ideal Poisson process.
Taking higher-order differences of exponentially distributed inter-arrivals times produces inter-arrivals that are n-
Erlang distributed. Considering inter-arrivals with any number of packets (i.e., summing the n-Erlang distributions
over n ∈ [1,∞]) the distribution also converges to 1
λ
.
Although our analysis considered an ideal Poisson input sequence some of the results are more general. The first
result shows that estimates of input traffic parameters calculated using the output of the measurement system are going
to be biased. Further the bias is different depending on if the measurement contains one packet versus measurements
with multiple packets. This makes intuitive sense because the measurements containing a single packet are precise,
the inter-arrival time is exact, yet they are left truncated. Conversely the measurements with multiple packets contain a
single precise inter-arrival time combined with multiple imprecise right-truncated inter-arrivals. Therefore when using
the output of the measurement system for estimating parameters of the input sequence knowledge of the potential
inaccuracies should be understood in advance.
We can make one final observation regarding parameter estimation using the output of the measurement system.
In order to estimate the input rate parameter λ it suffices to treat the output of the measurement system as an n-Erlang
distribution where n is itself random. Letting the output inter-arrival measurements be represented by the random
variable M = erlang(N, λ) then:
E[M ] = EC [Eλ[M |C = c]] = EC [C · λ] = λ · EC [C] (9)
Thus the expected value of the output inter-arrival sequence, without regard to number of packets per measurement C,
is exactly λ times the average number of packets per measurement at the output. Consequently we can estimate the
input rate parameter by
λˆ =
1
K
∑K
i=1M [i]
1
K
∑K
i=1 C[i]
(10)
without concern for shifted or right-truncated exponential distributions.
4 Measurement System Task
The detection task we are trying to design a method for is to detect periodic packets in aggregate traffic. The periodic
packets could be created by a denial-of-service (DOS) attack or correspond to the existence of a bottleneck link [5].
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The attack packets are spaced periodically, with period P seconds, because of two possible scenarios. The first is that
the code generating the attack packets spaces the packets at equal intervals. This can be the result of the algorithm
specifically outputting packets at a fixed period, or the algorithm attempting to output packets as fast as possible while
the host operating system (OS) or central processing unit (CPU) limits the packet output rate and outputs packets
periodically [18]. In the second scenario the attack packets encounter a bottleneck link upstream. The bottleneck
link outputs packets back-to-back at its maximum rate. Therefore the time between attack packets is constant and P
is equal to the time it takes to output one attack packet at the bottleneck link speed. If the attack packets flow into
a network with a higher link speed, then the time between attack packets is still equal to P even though the attack
packets are no longer back-to-back.
The above two scenarios have been considered previously. In [18] the authors consider spectral characteristics
of DOS attacks, which is shaped by the program used to generate the attack or the host system OS and CPU. Then
in [3] the spectral characteristics are used to ’fingerprint’ the attacks and identify repeated attacks bearing the same
fingerprint. The second scenario mentioned above is the basis for packet pair techniques that measure the end-to-end
available bandwidth of an internet link. In [19] the authors explain how by evaluating the inter-arrival time between
pairs of probe packets sent out over an internet link it is possible to measure the available bandwidth on that link. The
work in [5] applies the same principles found in packet pair techniques, but instead uses spectral techniques to identify
bottleneck links without the use of packet probes.
Although we assume that the attack packets are at one point periodic the task is to detect them in aggregate traffic.
This involves merging the attack traffic with background internet traffic, which does not preserve the exact periodic
structure of the attack packets. We can however assume that the time between attack packets is approximately equal
to P as any variation due to queuing with other packets are likely to be small. Further we can assume that in a fixed
time interval the average number of attack packets is going to be constant.
4.1 Measurement System Configuration and Test Data
In the analysis to follow we use two distinct measurement system configurations to highlight the performance differ-
ence between our detection method, Periodic Detection using Multiple Measurements (PDMM), and another capable
periodic detection system, Periodic Attack Detector (PAD). The two configurations were selected specifically to pro-
duce measurements with desired characteristics. The first system, HICv1, was selected to produce measurements with
significant variability in the number of packets per measurement, i.e. C[n], as well as in the inter-arrival time between
measurements, M [n] −M [n− 1]. HICv2 on the other hand was configured such that the majority of measurements
would be generated by the absolute timer, and thus the variability in the inter-arrival times would be much less (closer
to uniformly sampled signal). The system parameters for HICv1 are Tabs = 300 µSeconds and Tpack = 30 µSeconds
while the parameters for HICv2 are Tabs = 120 µSeconds and Tpack = 33 µSeconds. Note that the measurement
system settings were specifically selected to produce measurements with the desired characteristics based on prior
knowledge of the input traffic rate. The identical system settings are unlikely to produce the same measurement char-
acteristics for different input traffic rates, which is clearly shown in Section 6 when the above system parameters
produce different measurement characteristics for the high and low rate traces.
The test data used in the analysis of the detection methods consists of synthetic traces1which we created by com-
bining real background internet traffic at two different rates, 320 and 196 Mbps, with simulated attack traffic at a rate
of either 30 Mbps or 15 Mbps, using the stream merger application [20]. Specifically the high rate background traffic
was combined with the higher 30 Mbps rate attack while the lower rate background traffic was merged with the lower
rate (15 Mbps) attack. For the software based measurement systems the effect of interrupt coalescence was simulated
on the above trace data before the data was formatted for the proper signal representation.
The average packet rate for the combined input traces was around 80, 000 packets per second for the high rate
trace (320 Mbps background + 30 Mbps attack) and around 47, 000 packets per second for the low rate trace (196
Mbps background + 15 Mbps attack). At the output of the measurement system the average measurement rate was
approximately 11, 000 measurements per second for both measurement systems and for both input traces. Clearly the
effect of interrupt coalescence is more apparent on the high rate trace.
1All traces are provided by the LANDER project and available through PREDICT (https://www.predict.org) [21]
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4.2 Periodic Attack Detector (PAD)
Before discussing our method, which we design specifically for the measurement system, we motivate the need for
such design by showing how the measurement system can impact the performance of analysis techniques which as-
sume a typical uniformly sampled signal. We focus on a particular detection method called the PAD that was presented
in [5,6]. The PAD was chosen because it uses standard signal processing techniques, such as computation of the power
spectral density (PSD). Because the PAD computes the PSD of the signal the performance of the detection scheme
depends on the precision of the input signal. In a hardware based measurement system this is not an issue as the
precision of typical DAG measurement cards ranges from 10µSec to .1µSec [9]. However, when the measurement
system creates errors in the signal timing standard signal processing tools like the PSD are not as accurate and can de-
grade performance of detection methods that rely on them. Given the inaccuracies in the measurements if a uniformly
sampled signal is generated in the same manner as for the hardware based system the resulting signal will be distorted.
An example of a potential distortion is shown in Figure 8 where the uniformly sampled representation of the signal is
different between the software (top figure) and hardware systems (bottom figure) because of interrupt coalescence.
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Figure 8: Example of signal distortion due to interrupt coalescence
To show the degradation in performance of PAD we evaluated the time to detection for PAD using a signal gener-
ated from hardware and software system measurements. The software signal was generated as described in Section 4.1,
and the hardware signal was generated using the same synthetic trace without applying the simulated software mea-
surement system. The time to detection results for PAD using both the high rate input traffic (320 Mbps background +
30 Mbps attack) and the low rate input (196 Mbps background + 15 Mbps attack) are shown in Table 1. Clearly there
Measurement System Hardware HICv1 HICv2
High Rate Time to Detection (Seconds) .627 1.731 1.110
Low Rate Time to Detection (Seconds) .803 - -
Table 1: PAD detection performance comparing hardware and software measurement systems
is significant degradation in the performance of the PAD when using the software based measurements. Especially
in the low rate traffic scenario where PAD was unable to detect an attack in the 20 second window we allowed in
the experiment. The likely cause of the degradation is that the characteristics of the measurement system were not
considered in the design of PAD. Specifically, PAD assumes an accurate, uniformly sampled signal as input which
is not the case following the software measurement system. In the high rate input experiment PAD performed best
when the measurement system settings dictated that Tabs generate most of the interrupts. When Tabs generates most
of the interrupt the timing between measurements becomes more uniform, and PAD performs better. However, when
the input traffic is low rate then neither of the two measurement system settings cause Tabs to generate most of the
interrupts. This causes the timing between measurements to be highly randomized because they are controlled by
Tpack asserting interrupts, and interrupts asserted by Tpack are signal dependent.
5 Detection Using Multiple Measurements and the Pearson Chi-Square Test
From the results in the previous section it is clear that the measurement system affects the performance of standard
detection methods. Our goal in this section is to design a detection method using our knowledge about the measurement
system.
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5.1 Developing Intuition
The intuition behind our detection method begins with a pair of observations. First we noticed that in aggregate traffic
containing an attack inter-arrivals times between consecutive groups of packets were equal to the attack period with
probability greater than chance, where inter-arrival times are calculated as I[n] = M [n] −M [n − 1]. This occurs
because the ISRs that generate the time stamps are controlled by the packets, i.e., are signal dependent. By considering
how interrupt coalescence works we see that multiple situations exist where inter-arrival times would equal the attack
period, as illustrated by the two examples in Figure 9.
In the first example the initial packet in each group is an attack packet, and the interrupt for each group is asserted
by the absolute timer. Assuming the period of the attack is longer than the absolute timer, P > Tabs, then the inter-
arrival time between the consecutive groups of packets will be equal to the period, P . In the second example the
final packet in each group is a periodic packet and assuming the packet timer expires after the periodic packet in both
groups then the inter-arrival time of the groups of packets will be equal to the period of the attack signal. Further by
considering more than just back-to-back inter-arrivals (to be discussed below) many more scenarios similar to these
two simple examples occur, which create inter-arrival times equal to the attack period, P .
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Figure 9: Two examples of inter-arrivals equal to attack period due to interrupt coalescence
The second observation we made regards the background traffic. We found that if we considered not only the first
order inter-arrivals but higher order inter-arrivals as well, then the histogram of inter-arrivals is approximately uniform
over a fixed range. Higher degree inter-arrivals refers to taking the difference in time stamps of measurements further
apart than consecutive, i.e. Ii(n) = M(n)−M(n− i) where i > 1 is the order of the difference. The intuition behind
why the distribution of background traffic inter-arrivals is approximately uniform can be shown from the analysis in
section 3.2.1. Paxson [22] and many others have shown that background internet traffic is not an ideal Poisson process.
However, based on significant analysis of background traffic we found that the histogram of inter-arrivals is sufficiently
uniform to not generate false positives for our detection method described below.
5.2 Detection Method
Based on the above observations we designed a detection method that analyzes the distribution of first and higher
order inter-arrival times between groups of network packets. The first step in out method is to generate an inter-arrival
sequence, Ii(n) for i = 1, 2, ..., N from the measurements time stamps M [n]. Currently our method processes data in
blocks of length L, and uses the first block to populate the distribution before detection is performed. Thus for the first
L measurements an inter-arrival sequence is constructed. Then a histogram for the values in the inter-arrival sequence
is populated.
Once the histogram is initially populated the data is processed a block at a time using the same procedure: generate
inter-arrival sequence for block of data, and use the inter-arrival sequence to populate the histogram. Starting with the
second block of data, detection is performed after the new data is added to the histogram. Based of the second
observation above we use a hypothesis test where the null hypothesis is that the distribution is uniform. The Pearson
Chi-Square test, a common hypothesis test used to check goodness of fit to a known distribution, is used to evaluate
the histogram data to see how well the inter-arrivals fit a uniform distribution.
The Pearson Chi-Square test first segments the histogram data intoK sub-bins. Then using the uniform distribution
assumption the expected number of occurrences of inter-arrivals in each sub-bin is E = O/K where O is the sum of
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all the points in the histogram. Next a chi-square distributed random variable is computed using:
χ2 =
K∑
k=1
(Ok − E)
2
E
(11)
Where Ok is the actual number of occurrences in the kth sub-bin.
Finally the Pearson Statistic, p, is calculated, which is essentially the value of the CDF of a Chi-Square distribution
with K − 1 degrees of freedom computed at the value χ2. The null hypothesis, that the data does fit the uniform
distribution, is rejected if 1− p < T where T is used to control the probability of false alarm and is typically selected
to be 0.05.
Pseudocode of our detection method is given below. The detection first populates the histogram using a block
of measurements. After the histogram is populated the method process the incoming measurements in blocks of L
measurements. Processing involves updating the histogram, and then computing the value of the Chi-Square random
variable using Pearson’s method. Finally, the value of the Pearson statistic, p, is evaluated and compared against the
user selected threshold 1 − T . If an attack is detected the algorithm halts. If no attack is detected the algorithm
proceeds to process the next block of L measurements.
\*Initialize Histogram*\
for i = 1:N \*N=Order of Inter-arrivals*\
for n = i:L \*Initialize Histogram for L measurements*\
CurDif = M[n] - M[n-i]
Histogram(CurDif)++
end
end
\*Begin Detection*\
while(1)
for i = 1:N \*Order of Inter-arrivals*\
for n = i:L \*Update Histogram for L measurements*\
CurDif = M[n] - M[n-i]
Histogram(CurDif)++
end
end
NumBins = K
O = sum(Histogram)
E = O/NumBins
BinWidth = length(Histogram)/NumBins
ChiSq = 0
\*Compute value of ChiSq Random Variable*\
for j = 1:NumBins
O(j) = sum(Histogram((j-1)*BinWidth:j*BinWidth))
ChiSq = ChiSq + (O(j)-E)ˆ2/E
end
\*Compute Pearson Statistic using ChiSq pdf with K-1
Degrees of Freedom*\
p = chisqpdf(ChiSq, NumBins - 1)
if (p > 1-T)
\*Detected Attack*\
break;
end
end
There is one caveat to our method which is that due to system effects, inter-arrivals below Tabs are not uniformly
distributed. Specifically many inter-arrivals occur near Tpack and Tabs. Because of this the detection method ignores
inter-arrivals shorter than Tabs. However, this does not impact our ability to detect periodic signals with P < Tabs.
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If we take inter-arrivals of sufficient order then our method should still be able to detect a harmonic multiple of the
base period that is larger than Tabs, i.e. instead of detecting P we can detect kP > Tabs. There also is an upper limit
on the length of the inter-arrivals considered, which is selected such that we can still capture the attack period of very
low rate attacks. The upper limit, TMax must be selected such that TMax > P . Selecting a larger value of TMax
often requires taking a higher order differences in inter-arrival times as well, because for larger TMax the higher order
inter-arrival differences are required to produce a near uniform distribution of the histogram.
5.3 Generic Detection Example
Here we examine detection of a single periodic peak without harmonics in background traffic with a perfect uniform
distribution of inter-arrival times. We consider the percent deviation, S, in a particular sub-bin required to detect the
periodic peak. Let K be the total number of sub-bins, and O be the total number of points in the histogram. Then the
expected number inter-arrivals in each sub-bin is:
E =
O
K
(12)
The actual number of occurrences in the sub-bin with the periodic peak is:
Oi = (
1
K
+ S) ·O (13)
and the actual number of occurrences in the remaining bins is:
Oj = (
1
K
−
S
K − 1
) · O j 6= i (14)
Computing the chi-square random variable:
χ2 =
1
E

(Oi − E)2 +∑
j 6=i
(Oj − E)
2


χ2 =
K
O
[
(S ·O)2 + (K − 1) · (
S · O
K − 1
)2
]
χ2 = S2 · O(K +
K
K − 1
)
(15)
What we see from the above equation is that the chi-square value depends on: the total number of measurements
and the percent deviation from uniformity created by the periodic peak. The value of χ2 required to exceed the null
hypothesis threshold, T , depends on the number of degrees of freedom of χ2 which is K−1, so increasing the number
of sub-bins is not an efficient strategy for increasing detection performance. Notice that the value of χ2 depends on
S2 so larger deviations will be detected quicker geometrically instead of linearly.
6 Experiments
To examine the performance of our detection method we compare it to the performance of the PAD detection method
for a few input traffic and measurement system combinations. The input traffic and measurement system combinations
were specifically selected to highlight how certain traffic characteristics affected the performance of the detection
methods. To show the traffic characteristics quantitatively we consider the variance in the inter-arrival times (first
order only) of the measurements at the output of the measurement system.
The input traffic signals and measurement system configurations used in the experiments were described in sec-
tion 4.1. First we consider the high rate signal (320 Mbsp background + 30 Mbps attack). Using the high rate signal
as the input to our two measurement systems the signal characteristics at the output were very different. Following the
HICv1 system the variance in the measurement inter-arrival times was 2.78 Nano-Seconds2, and for the HICv2 sys-
tem the variance was much smaller at 1.37 Nano-Seconds2. The ratio between these values is approximately 2. Note
that the mean in the inter-arrival times between measurements is nearly identical for both output signals at around
90 Micro-Seconds. The larger variance in the measurement inter-arrivals for HICv1 indicates that the inter-arrival
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times are more random. This should benefit PDMM which uses the information in the inter-arrival times to perform
detection. The lower variance value found in the measurements from HICv2 indicates that the inter-arrivals are less
random, and more like the uniform sample intervals that PAD expect.
Because our detection method is specifically designed for the software measurement system output we do not test
it using the hardware system signal. The time to detection results for the high rate signal using PAD and PDMM
detection methods are shown in Table 2.
Measurement System Hardware HICv1 HICv2
PAD - Time to Detection (Seconds) .627 1.731 1.110
PDMM - Time to Detection (Seconds) - .62 1.31
Table 2: Detection performance for PAD and PDMM using the 320 Mbps background + 30 Mbps attack signal
There are a few interesting details in the results of the first experiment. The first is that given the software system
output that was designed to be more ’random’ (HICv1), having a higher inter-arrival time variance, our method detects
the attack much quicker than PAD and even rivals the performance of PAD using hardware measurements. Thus
we achieve our goal of designing a detection method that by considering the measurement system can outperform a
generic detection method. Second, given the measurement system configuration designed to produce measurements
that are more like a uniformly sampled signal, thus having a lower inter-arrival time variance, PAD outperforms our
method. This second point shows how important it is to consider the effect of the measurement system. By altering the
measurement system configuration it is possible to operate in regions where the output signal characteristics benefit one
detection method over the other. Our detection method was designed for when the measurement system was operation
under normal conditions, where the interrupts were generated primarily by Tpack, yet in more extreme conditions,
interrupts generated mainly by Tabs, the performance of our method degrades and PAD improves.
Next we consider detection performance for the two mechanisms when using the low rate signal (196 Mbps back-
ground + 15 Mbps attack) as input to the measurement system. After the HICv1 system the variance in the measure-
ment inter-arrival time was much smaller at 2.08 Nano-Seconds2, while at the output of the HICv2 system the variance
was similar to that for v1 at 1.78 Nano-Seconds2. For the low rate input signal the ratio of the variances is much closer
to unity at 1.16. The cause of the change in characteristics from the high rate case are due to the fact that the input
traffic rate is no longer high enough to force HICv2 into the extreme condition where most interrupts are generated by
Tabs.
Based on characteristics of the output of the measurement system we could expect that the detection performance
of PDMM would be significantly better than PAD. This is indeed the case as is shown in Table 3. Notice that for both
measurement systems while using the low rate input PAD was unable to detect an attack over the 20 Second window
of time that we allowed for detection.
Measurement System Hardware HICv1 HICv2
PAD - Time to Detection (Seconds) .803 - -
PDMM - Time to Detection (Seconds) - .97 .88
Table 3: Detection performance for PAD and PDMM using the 196 Mbps background + 15 Mbps attack signal
The second experiment also has a few interesting conclusions. The first is that the results strengthen our previous
argument that one must consider the effect of the measurement system. In this experiment the measurement system
produced an output signal that was better suited for PDMM, and the detection performance showed this. Further,
and different from the first experiment, the output signal characteristics at the output of both measurement systems
were nearly identical and the time to detection for PDMM was nearly identical for the two output signals. The second
conclusion that can be drawn from this experiment is that if one desires to select the measurement system configuration
for a given detection method then the input signal must be taken into consideration. Looking at HICv2, in the first
experiment the input traffic rate was high enough to force the measurement system into an extreme condition where
most interrupts were generated by Tabs. In this situation PAD was the better choice for detection. However, in the
second experiment with the same measurement system configuration the input traffic rate was not high enough to force
the extreme condition and PAD was a poor choice for detection.
Based on the results of the above experiments it is clear that the measurement system has a significant affect on the
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detection performance for both mechanisms. Additionally, the relationship between the input traffic and measurement
system configuration must also be considered as this interaction determines the relevant characteristics of the output
signal which effect detection performance.
7 Conclusion
We began this paper by examining the operation of typical software measurement systems. It was seen that measure-
ment systems that employed timer-based or packet-based interrupt coalescence were less desirable than the hybrid
method of IC due to latency issues under certain input traffic situations. Because of this we focused our attention on
the hybrid method of interrupt coalescence and developed a deeper understanding of its effect on the timing of the
input traffic signal. This led us to derive a signal representation at the output of the software measurement system that
better conveyed the important signal characteristics. With our increased understanding of the measurement system and
improved signal representation we next examined a typical analysis task, periodic signal detection.
While analyzing a generic periodic signal detection method, PAD, we found that the detection performance de-
graded significantly between detection using a hardware system measured signal and one measured using a software
based system. Using our knowledge of the hybrid measurement system we derived a new detection method, PDMM,
specifically for the signal representation at the output of the measurement system. Through a select set of experiments
we learned a few important lessons about the relationship between input traffic, measurement system configuration,
and detection method.
The first lesson learned was that with careful consideration of the measurement system we can significantly im-
prove detection performance compared to a generic detection method. Second, we learned that under certain input
traffic and measurement system configurations the output of the measurement system will obtain characteristics that
are amenable to detection using PAD. As mentioned in Section 6 when the length of Tpack is long enough then most of
the interrupts are generated by Tabs. When this occurs the variance in the inter-arrival timing between measurements
decreases, which leads to less information being contained in the inter-arrival timings. This situation is similar to uni-
form sampling and more relevant information is contained in the number of packets per measurement. Thus, although
we designed our detection method using knowledge of the measurement system, and our method outperforms PAD
under typical measurement conditions there are still situations were another method, like PAD, will be a better choice.
This highlights the fact that we set out to prove initially, that careful consideration must be taken when analyzing mea-
surements that were obtained from a software-based measurement system. Figure 10 shows the relationship between
the information contained in the inter-arrival timings versus the information contained in the number of packets per
measurement. The line corresponds to a fixed selection of measurement system parameters, and as indicated on the
graph if the input traffic rate increases then the signal information will slide from having more relevant information
in the measurement inter-arrivals (good for PDMM) to the information being contained in the number of packets per
measurement (good for PAD).
Figure 10: Graph showing where relevant measurement information is contained as input traffic rate varies
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